




Herding through the tails? 
 









This paper investigates institutional herding for extreme event-days in the US stock market 
between 2000 and 2010.  We show that, for more extreme return’ stocks, abnormal returns and 
abnormal turnover are strongly linked to institutional ownership. Six month post-event 
performance show evidence of overreaction and underreaction by institutions on the event-days, 











Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MSc in Business 












































Foremost, I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor 
José Faias. Without his continuous support, his motivational strength, his share of 
knowledge and his patience, this master thesis could not have been done. I could not be 
more grateful to him.  
Besides my supervisor, I have to thank to my girlfriend Carlota that was there for me at 
all time; my parents to allow me to study what I love; my friends Miguel, Ana, João, 
Marta, Pedro, Daniela, Paulo, Claudio, Gonçalo, Luís and Francisco; my colleagues at 
Banco BPI; my colleagues of the Empirical Finance seminar; my beloved family for their 
unconditional support. 
Last but not least, I have to give a special acknowledge to Fundação para a Ciência e 






























I. Introduction  1 
II. Data and Methodology  3 
III. All Stocks             6 
 
     1. Event-days Descriptive Statistics  6 
     2. Abnormal Return Evidence             9 
     3. Abnormal Turnover Evidence           13 
     4. Post-event Performance           15 
     5. Conditional Event-Day Definition           18 
IV. Extreme Stocks           19 
     1. Event-days Descriptive Statistics           20 
     2. Abnormal Return Evidence           22 
     3. Abnormal Turnover Evidence           24 
     4. Post-event Performance           25 
V. Conclusion                27 















Index of Tables 
 
Table I - Extreme Days’ Market Returns            4 
 
Table II - Event-Day Descriptive Statistics  – All stocks        7 
 
Table III - Event-day Adjusted market Return Regression  – All stocks   10 
 
Table IV - Event-Day Abnormal Turnover Regression  – All stocks    14 
 
Table V - Post-event Performance Statistics  – All stocks      17 
 
Table VI - Event-Day Descriptive Statistics  – Extreme Stock Returns   21 
 
Table VII - Event-day Adjusted market Return Regression  – Extreme Stock Returns 22 
 
Table VIII - Event-Day Abnormal Turnover Regression  – Extreme Stock Returns  25 
 
Table IX - Post-event Performance Statistics – Extreme Stock Returns   26 
 
Index of Figures 
 
Figure 1 - Unconditional event-days	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  4 
	  
Figure 2 – Evolution of total, domestic and foreign institutional ownership  
between 2000 and 2010	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	   	   	  	  5	  
 







































De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find evidence that investors overreact to both bad and good 
news.  As a consequence to this overreaction, past losers become underpriced and past 
winners become overpriced.  Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) show that by using 
“contrarian strategies” in a short-term period, it is possible to have exceptionally large returns, 
which can outperform the market.  These strategies are transaction intensive and their 
performance could be due to lack of liquidity in the market or the presence of short-term price 
pressure rather than overreaction.  Others like Shefrin and Statman (1985), Lehman (1990) 
and Goetzmann and Massimo (2002) also show how buying past losers, or selling past 
winners consistently leads to very positive returns.  While the former find empirical evidence 
with holding periods of 3 to 5 years, Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) bump into the 
same conclusion but find evidence of overreaction in shorter periods (months and weeks). 
Evidence of overreaction is also examine in other markets. Schiereck, De Bondt, and Weber 
(1999) examine contrarian strategies for companies listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange 
and their results show that implementing these contrarian strategies outperform a passive 
approach. The same results are obtained for the Japanese stock market (Chang et al. (1995)), 
for  the Chinese Stock market (Kang et al. (2002)), for the Malaysia market (Hameed and 
Ting (2000) and for the Korean markets (Chui et al. (2000)). 
Dennis and Strickland (2002) (henceforth DS) analyzes who is responsible for this 
overreaction.  They consider two types of investors, institutional and individuals. The 
importance of institutions on the equity markets have been growing for the past few decades. 
Institutional ownership (IO) is the percentage of capital owned by institutions such as banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, endowments and mutual funds. According to Jiang 
(2010), at the end of 2004, institutional investors hold 53% of the US equity market, a 
significant increase from the 20% that was registered in 1980.  At the end of 1989, institutions 
were responsible for 70% of the trading volume (Schwartz and Shapiro (1992)) whereas in 
2002 they were already responsible for 96% of the volume trade on the NYSE (Jones and 
Lipson (2004)).  
There is a strong positive relation between institutional trading and stock returns, 
suggesting that institutional investors herd together and trade with the momentum (Nofsinger 




premise, that institutional investors herd when there is a large drop or a large increase on the 
market, it can be concluded that they are moving stock’s prices away from their true value 
(Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)) and if that is so, the market will be forced to correct them 
and to move their prices to their fundamental value again.  Morris and Shin (1999) and 
Persaud (2000) argue that herding behaviour creates volatility, destabilize the market and 
force firms to focus on short-term strategies.  If this is true, it is possible to take advantage of 
this situation.  
We follow Dennis and Strickland (2002).  We use US stock data between 2000 and 2010 
to test if institutional investors are herding during days with extreme returns.  We make 
several contributions.  First, we enlarge the sample size of extreme returns due to the choice 
of the period of time.  Second, this is a more recent period of time and the previous results 
could not hold.  Third, we use two methodologies to study this effect. These show that some 
stocks, the trendy, have a different pattern from just taking the market as a whole.  
 We identify two types of event-days, days in which there is a large market drop, down 
market, and days in which there is a large market increase, up market.  We link abnormal 
stock return and abnormal turnover on each event-day to institutional ownership.  If 
institutional investors are selling (buying) more than individuals in days when there is a large 
market drop (increase), stocks with higher IO in their capital structure should have more 
negative (positive) returns since these investors herd and trade with the momentum.   
Empirical evidence shows that there is some correlation between these two variables, 
however, the relationship is different from what was expected.  If herding is occurring on such 
extreme days, the empirical evidence suggests that institutions are not contributing for the 
extreme returns, in fact they are not trading with the momentum but against it.  Evidence from 
the abnormal turnover model also shows that the level of turnover of a stock on the event-day 
is positively related to the presence of institutions on a stock capital structure suggesting that 
institutions react strongly to the extreme day. 
We analyze post-event performances, six months after the event-day in order to test if 
institutions are overreacting to the event-day and deviating stock’s prices away from their true 
value.  Post-herding returns reveal evidence of underreaction (overreaction) for the up (down) 
market event-days.  These results are consistent in accordance to Schnusenberg and Madura 
(2001) and Lasfer, Melnik and Thomas (2003).  The results for the up market event-days are 




not be related to information, but rather it may be just a result from irrational psychological 
factors that cause price bubbles (Dreman (1979) and Friedman (1984)). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II explains the data and 
methodology.  Section III and IV present our empirical findings for all stocks in the market 
and for the trendy extreme stocks, respectively.  Section V presents the concluding remarks. 
 
II. Data and Methodology 
 
The stock return data consists of 3,422 stocks of Nasdaq and NYSE between January 1, 
2000 and December 31, 2010 from Bloomberg.  We are limited in our sample to the IO 
availability data that is obtained through Factset/Lionshares database. This period implies a 
larger sample of extreme return stock market days.  We define the market return to be the 
equal-weighted average of all stocks in each day.  
In order to find the event-days, the market return is compared against its unconditional 
eleven-year average.  We define an (a) up (down) market event-days as a day when the 
market return is two standard deviations above (below) its unconditional average.  Table I 
contains some of the dates and market returns of those event-days for exemplification.1 
Between 2000 and 2010 there are 60 up market event-days, with an average return of 4.24% 
and 68 down market event-days with an average return of -4.54%.  To check if the general 
trend in the market was reflected on these event-days for most of its individual stock, the 
percentage of positive, negative and zero-return firms is computed.  We also compute the 
ratio of positive (negative) return firms to negative (positive) return firms for the up (down) 
market event-days.  Large positive or negative returns for a small number of firms could 
produce an extreme market return when in fact the trend was to have returns with the opposite 
sign. For the up market event-days, the minimum percentage of positive firms is 67.17%, with 
a correspondent ratio of 2.64, which is registered on April 18, 2000. On May 27, 2010 it is 
registered the largest percentage of positive firms, 93.17%, with a correspondent ratio of 
15.40. The average ratio for the up market event-days is 6.24, which means that on average 
there are 6 times more companies with positive returns than firms with negative returns. The 
trend is similar to the down market event-days, with an average ratio of 8.88. The smallest 
percentage of negative firms for these days is 71.80% with a ratio of 3.42, registered on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Extreme Days’ Market Returns 
This table presents a list of some of the event-days with dates, mean returns (%), percentage of firms with 
positive, negative, and zero returns.  The ratio for up market event-days is the ratio of percent positive to percent 
negative while for down market event-days is the ratio of percent negative to percent positive.  The mean return 
represents the market returns and it is equal to the equal-weighted average of all stocks in the sample from 





















Panel A: Equal-Weighted Up Event-Days Panel B: Equal-Weighted Down Event-Days 
00/03/16 3.05 70.52 6.09 23.39 3.01 00/04/14 -6.24 10.76 5.11 84.14 7.82 
00/04/18 4.00 67.17 7.38 25.45 2.64 00/12/20 -3.63 21.02 7.17 71.80 3.42 
00/12/05 3.19 69.84 7.81 22.34 3.13 01/03/12 -3.32 13.39 5.70 80.92 6.04 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
10/05/10 4.72 93.14 1.10 5.76 16.16 10/06/01 -2.90 9.57 1.05 89.38 9.34 
10/05/27 3.81 93.17 0.78 6.05 15.40 10/06/04 -4.28 5.54 1.35 93.11 16.79 
10/06/10 3.07 92.02 1.40 6.58 13.98 10/06/29 -3.92 4.26 1.12 94.62 22.21 
 
December 20, 2000. On May 20, 2010 the largest percentage of negative firms is registered, 
96.12% with a ratio of negative firms of 30.50. When comparing the data sample to DS, the 
differences are relevant. During their period of analysis (between 1988 and 1996), they 
register only 6 up event-days and 10 down event-days. The different frequency can be 
assigned to the financial crisis of 2007. Until 2007, there are only 12 up market event-days 





Figure 1. Unconditional event-days. Above the timeline are registered the up market event-days and below the timeline are 
registered the down market event-days. 
 
Our hypothesis is that institutional investors herd and together react to the extreme days. 
As a consequence, on such event-days, stocks that have more percentage of IO on their capital 
structure have larger price swings.  What this theory implies is that the distribution of returns 
on such event-days is linked to the level of IO of the firms.  If institutions are in fact the cause 
of this market volatility and if they are only contributing to move stock’s prices away from 
their true value, the post-event performance will also be linked to the level of IO, once the 




We divide our analysis into two main sections.  The first section runs the same framework 
as DS, but for a different time period.  The second section uses only the extreme returns 
stocks that follow the market.  
IO is defined as being the percentage of a firm’s capital that institutions (i.e. banks, 
pension funds, mutual funds, endowments) hold. The IO is also split into domestic IO (dom 
io) and foreign IO (for io). dom io is the percentage of domestic IO on a firm’s capital 
structure and for io is the percentage of foreign IO on a firm’s capital structure. All of the data 
was obtained through Factset/Lionshares database. Concerning the level of ownership of 
domestic and foreign investors, it is possible to find huge differences on our sample.  Foreign 
investors still have a very small participation on the US market when compared to domestic 
ones.  The average level of foreign ownership on the event-days is 2.7 and 2.8 percent for up 
and down market event-days while domestic investors have an average level of ownership on 
the same event-days of 55.7 and 56.3 percent. Figure 2 shows the differences between the 
level of dom io and for io in our sample.   It is important to note that the level of foreign IO is 
very low on our sample when compared to previous papers that have analyzed the level of 
foreign institutions on firm’s capital structure (Ornelas and Alemanni (2008); Chen Yang and 
Lin (2012)). Note that these previous paper analyse foreign institutional ownership in 
emerging markets. With this categorization the goal is to understand if the different types of 
institutions, have different reactions on such event-days. Most of the financial literature 
highlights the differences between domestic and foreign institutional investors, therefore it is 
important to try to understand the differences between these two kinds of investors and their 
impact on our study.  
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Despite the recent trend of globalization and the increase of cross-border investment, 
foreign investment is still very limited when compared to local investment. French and 
Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Kang and Stulz (1997) find that the existence of 
the home bias is still very present and that usually investors tend to overweight their 
portfolios with domestic firms. Brennan and Cao (1997) attribute this overweight to the 
difference of information that each of these two types of investors have. Usually foreign 
investors are less informed.  On the other hand, foreign institutions have good resources, not 
only financial but also human.  Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) even argue that foreign 
institutions, because of their expertise and local resources can be smarter and more informed 
than domestic investors.  Seasholes (2000) finds evidence that on Taiwan, foreign investors 
buy stocks ahead of good earnings announcements and sell before the announcement of bad 
earnings.  In contrast, Kang and Stulz (1997) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show 
evidence of better performance by domestic institutions. Another reason that can be attributed 
to the better performance of domestic institutions is the access to private information. In 
countries where insider trading can occur, domestic firms will have a better probability to 
perform better than foreign.  The use of this private information will only be seen on a short 
period of analysis since on the long term the market shall be efficient. But this is not the case 
for our sample. Another reason to disaggregate into these two types of institution is their 
strategy style.  Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) and Swanson and Lin (2005) state that foreign 
institutions have a preference for momentum strategies, buying winners and selling losers. 
 
III. All Stocks 
 
1. Event-Days Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the up and down event-days are presented on Panels A and B 
of Table II, respectively. To explain abnormal returns and abnormal turnover on the event-
days, we use the following variables: (a) size, the natural logarithm of the stock’s equity 50 
days prior to the event-day; (b) turnover, the daily volume of a stock on the event-day 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding; (c) variance which is the 
market model residual variance for the period t-250 days to t-50 days (being t the event-day); 
(d) beta, the beta of the stocks daily returns with the market return for the period t-250 to t-50; 




daily return of a firm on the event-day. We also separate higher from lower IO firms. Our 
results confirms the findings of previous literature. On average, high IO firms are larger than 
low IO firms (Gompers and Metrick (2001), Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003) and Campbell, 
Ramadorai and Schwartz (2009)).  Firms with lower levels of IO are less liquid than firms 
with higher levels of IO (Gompers and Metrick (2001), Bennett et al. (2003) and Agarwal 
(2007)).  Firms with more IO on their capital structure have on average lower idiosyncratic 
volatility but more systematic risk (Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2009); Zhang (2010)). 
Table II 
Event-Day Descriptive Statistics  – All stocks 
This table presents the descriptive statistics (minimum, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile, maximum, 
and standard deviation) for the 60 up market event-days (Panel A) and for the 68 down market event-days (Panel 
B). The event-days are defined as (a) up market, days in which the market return is two standard deviations 
above its eleven-year average (from 2000 to 2010) and (b) down market, days in which the market return is two 
standard deviations below its eleven-year average (from 2000 to 2010). Statistics for all firms, and two 
subsamples, firms with IO below and above the median, are presented. The variables analyzed are size, the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s equity 50 days prior to the event-day; turnover, the daily volume of a stock 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding on the event-day; variance, the market 
model residual variance for the period [-250,-50]; beta, the beta of stocks daily returns with the market return for 
the period [-250, -50]; io, the percentage of IO on the capital structure of a company on the event-day; and return 
the daily return of a firm on the event-day. 
 
Panel A: Up Event-Days 
Variable Sample Min 25th Median Mean 75th Max Std dev 
size All firms 13.747 15.391 15.628 15.587 15.823 16.370 0.332 
  io < Median 13.747 15.195 15.413 15.402 15.625 16.370 0.334 
  io > Median 14.939 15.629 15.762 15.773 15.908 16.305 0.201 
turnover All firms 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.371 0.011 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.371 0.011 
  io > Median 0.000 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.016 0.100 0.009 
variance All firms 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.032 0.002 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.032 0.002 
  io > Median 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.001 
beta All firms -0.786 0.654 0.994 0.966 1.261 3.429 0.445 
  io < Median -0.786 0.455 0.812 0.830 1.178 3.429 0.483 
  io > Median 0.042 0.879 1.096 1.103 1.319 3.378 0.353 
io All firms 0.000 0.336 0.646 0.584 0.846 1.000 0.298 
  io < Median 0.000 0.160 0.336 0.329 0.499 0.645 0.191 
  io > Median 0.647 0.756 0.846 0.839 0.926 1.000 0.101 
return All firms -0.059 0.026 0.041 0.041 0.055 0.187 0.022 
  io < Median -0.059 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.051 0.187 0.024 










Table II – Continued 
 
Panel B: Down Event-Days 
Variable Sample Min 25th Median Mean 75th Max Std dev 
size All firms 13.864 15.399 15.635 15.598 15.832 16.370 0.328 
  io < Median 13.864 15.214 15.418 15.416 15.631 16.370 0.330 
  io > Median 14.969 15.637 15.766 15.780 15.915 16.306 0.199 
turnover All firms 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.160 0.009 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.160 0.007 
  io > Median 0.000 0.006 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.099 0.009 
variance All firms 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.117 0.003 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.117 0.004 
  io > Median 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.001 
beta All firms -0.818 0.631 0.994 0.963 1.267 4.650 0.461 
  io < Median -0.818 0.429 0.783 0.826 1.193 4.650 0.511 
  io > Median -0.123 0.873 1.101 1.101 1.316 2.743 0.356 
io All firms 0.000 0.340 0.652 0.590 0.857 1.000 0.300 
  io < Median 0.000 0.166 0.340 0.333 0.502 0.652 0.194 
  io > Median 0.653 0.764 0.857 0.848 0.935 1.000 0.100 
return All firms -0.276 -0.056 -0.042 -0.043 -0.029 0.094 0.022 
  io < Median -0.276 -0.053 -0.036 -0.038 -0.023 0.094 0.024 
  io > Median -0.174 -0.059 -0.046 -0.048 -0.035 0.011 0.019 
 
The average beta for the low IO firms is 0.830 and 0.826 for up and down market days, 
respectively. For high IO firms the betas are 1.103 and 1.101, respectively. The betas between 
the two subsamples based on IO are statistically different. These results suggest that firms 
with more IO have their returns’ variations more linked to changes in the market, i.e., firms 
with more IO are more exposed to extreme market swings. IO statistics is similar for Up and 
Down event-days. The mean level of IO is around 59% while the median is nearly 65%.2 
There is a high level of cross sectional variation. On low IO firms, the first quartile is around 
16%,  whereas the third quartile is 50%.  The high IO firms have a smaller standard deviation, 
but still considerable cross sectional variation.  This heterogeneity is explored in the next 
section to register different reactions by institutional investors.  The median and the average 
returns are statistically lower for the low IO firms in comparison to high IO firms.  There is a 
higher level of clustering on returns for the high IO firms, reinforcing the idea of herding, i.e., 
for the high IO firms, that also have higher/lower returns on the up , the value of standard 
deviation is lower when comparing it to the low IO firms. The high IO firms are also larger 
and more liquid, which can be the reason for this. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The next step is to disentangle IO into domestic and foreign.  Overall, the descriptive 
statistics for domestic and foreign IO are similar to those analyzed previously, and the results 
are not tabulated.  The main difference is that foreign institutions are more conservative. On 
average, domestic institutions invest more on stocks with higher systematic risk compared to 
foreign institutions.  The high IO firms, besides having higher absolute returns on the event-
days, they also have a larger clustering of positive (negative) returns, fitting the idea that 
institutions, foreign and domestic, herd and trade with the momentum.  Again, these results 
are not enough to conclude that herd happens.  The existence of higher absolute returns on the 
high ownership portfolio can be just a consequence of the presence of more liquid firms.   
 
2. Abnormal Return Evidence 
 
This section explores the relationship between the event-day abnormal return and the the 
percentage of institutions as shareholders. We run Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of 
the type: 
!"! = γ! + γ!!"#$! + γ!!"#$%&'#! + γ!!"#$"%&'! + γ!!"#$! + γ!!"! + !! (1) 
 
where the dependent variable ari is the market adjusted return for firm i on the event-day j and 
the independent variables are as before.  The market adjusted return is defined as being the 
difference between stock’s i return on the event-day j and the eleven-year average (2000-
2010) of stock’s i return.  The time-series average coefficients of each parameter are 
presented on Table III.   Panel A presents results for IO and Panel B uses disaggregated IO 
into domestic and foreign.3 Size is also correlated with the level of IO of the firm (Gompers 
and Metrick (2001). We include size in the regression, to avoid capturing size effects in the 
IO variable.  The size of a firm is also related to the level of risk. The lack of theoretical 
explanation for why smaller firms are riskier, has led several researchers to try to understand 
this anomaly. Banz (1981) was the first to discuss the size anomaly. The inverse relation 
between size and return has led Banz (1981) to interpret as evidence that small firms have 
higher expected returns (Ball (1978); Chen (1988); Berk (1997)). It is not important to the 
analysis to understand if the size variable is a risk factor or an institutional preference factor. 
The main goal is to prevent a bias on the results of our regression and to make it as robust as 
possible. Concerning our estimation model results, the variable size does not have any 
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  We do not use the Generalized Least Squares method, since there is a substantial number of firms larger than the number of event-days, 




statistical significant relationship with the market adjusted returns on the event-days, neither 
for up nor down market event-days. It would be expected that if the value-weighted analysis 
had been done, size would have a higher relationship with the dependent variable. 
 
Table III 
Event-day Adjusted market Return Regression  – All stocks 
This table presents the result for the event-day adjusted market return regression on IO and control variables for 
the equal-weighted market following this model: 
 
!"! = γ! + γ!!"#$! + γ!!"#$%&'#! + γ!!"#$"%&'! + γ!!"#$! + γ!!"! + !! 
 
The event-days are defined as (a) up market, days in which the market return is two-standard deviations above its 
eleven-year average (from 2000 to 2010) and (b) down market, days in which the market return is two standard 
deviation below its eleven-year average (from 2000 to 2010) minus two standard deviations. The dependent 
variable is the event-day adjusted market return, defined as being the daily return of firm i on event-day j minus 
the eleven-year average (2000-2010) of firm’s i return. The independent variables are size, defined as the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s equity 50 days prior to the event-day; turnover, which is the daily volume of a stock 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding on the event-day; variance which is the 
market model residual variance for the period [-250,-50]; beta, computed as the beta of stocks daily returns with 
the market return for the period [-250, -50]; io, which is the percentage of IO on the capital structure of a 
company on the event-day. Results are presented for both aggregated and segregated IO, divided into dom io, 
which is the percentage of domestic IO on the capital structure of a company on the event-day and for io, which 
is the percentage of foreign IO on the capital structure of a company on the event-day. The table presents the 
mean, minimum and maximum coefficient estimated. It is also reported the t-statistic corresponding to a test of 
the mean being different from zero. 
 
	  	   Up Days 	  	   Down Days 
  Mean t-stat Min Max   Mean t-stat Min Max 
Panel A: Aggregated IO 
size 0.004 0.68 -0.063 0.093   -0.001 -0.60 -0.054 0.03 
turnover 0.264 3.77 -0.682 1.605   -0.529 -6.23 -2.213 1.148 
variance -0.025 -0.08 -5.906 13.346   -0.726 -1.84 -14.788 5.84 
beta 0.029 9.26 -0.012 0.074   -0.025 -6.77 -0.078 0.011 
io 0.002 1.19 -0.036 0.029   0.003 1.76 -0.026 0.03 
Panel B: Segregated IO 
size 0.005 0.97 -0.063 0.094   -0.003 -1.32 -0.053 0.031 
turnover 0.275 3.90 -0.659 1.618   -0.540 -6.37 -2.224 1.115 
variance 0.067 0.23 -5.662 13.312   -0.846 -2.18 -14.827 5.954 
beta 0.029 9.34 -0.012 0.073   -0.025 -6.78 -0.078 0.011 
dom io 0.003 1.77 -0.035 0.031   0.001 0.99 -0.028 0.028 
for io -0.035 -4.87 -0.148 0.077   0.040 4.95 -0.086 0.199 
 
The liquidity factor is also important for institutions. Institutional investors choose stocks 
with a high level of liquidity since they usually have large positions on their capital structure 
and need to be able to trade. This is only possible with stocks that can be traded in high 
volumes.  Agarwal (2007) examines the relationship between IO and liquidity, finding results 




institutions prefer more liquid stocks due to safety or reduced transactions costs by trading in 
big blocks. Not surprisingly, our results show that turnover is very related to the market 
adjusted returns, being the second variable with more statistical significance for both up and 
down market event-days. During the event-days, higher turnover is associated with larger 
market swings, (positive for the up market event-days and negative for the down market 
event-days). These results suggest that firms that are more liquid, experience large market 
movements. 
Kothare and Laux (1995) and Falkenstein (1996) found evidence that links institutional 
holdings with more volatile stocks. Their comprehensive data found that institutional 
investors, compared against individual investors, prefer stocks with high idiosyncratic 
volatility.  Falkenstein (1996) specifically, using data covering the period of 1991 and 1992, 
finds that mutual funds have a preference for high-volatility stocks.  On the other hand, Sias 
(1996) has empirical evidence that fits this previous findings, but goes against the 
interpretation that institutional investors choose to select riskier stocks.  In fact, he shows that 
an increase of IO on stock’s capital structures may be the reason of increase on volatility. 
Nevertheless, it is not the goal of this analysis to try to understand what is the cause of the 
volatility, but only to avoid bias on our results, therefore the variable variance is included on 
the abnormal return regression. Another reason to include this variable on the regression, is 
attribute to Dierkens (1991) that proposes that idiosyncratic volatility is a useful measure of 
informational asymmetry. Since institutions are informed market agents, this implies a 
negative relationship between the level of informational asymmetry and the level of IO. The 
variance results are inconclusive. For the up market event-days, it is not found any 
relationship between the adjusted market returns and stock’s variance, while for the down 
market event-days there is some statistical significance between the two variables.  Since beta 
is also a proxy of a stock’s risk, it is imperative to include it on the regression. Omitting this 
variable could also bias our results. The largest statistical significance that is found, concerns 
the stock’s beta. As it was expected, firms with higher betas, have on up market event-days 
larger returns, while for down market event-days present smaller returns. 
 The variable of main interest for the analysis is the IO. The goal is to try to find statistical 
significance, once this would suggest that institutional investors react to large market swings.   
IO only is important for the down market event-days and only at the 10% significance level.  




level of IO is not so significant for aggregate levels, when split into domestic and foreign IO, 
the results are surprisingly different.  Panel B  shows that the level of foreign IO during days 
of extreme returns is significantly related with the levels of stock’s abnormal returns, for both 
types of event-days.  Despite the high level of significance, the coefficient magnitude shows 
that stocks with higher levels of IO have smaller absolute returns on the event-day.  In fact, 
the results from our regression lead us to conclude that foreign institutions are not 
contributing to the extreme returns verified on the event-days, contradicting the general trend 
in the market on such days.  On the other hand, the results for domestic institutions on such 
event-days do not lead to any conclusive result.  The level of significance of the domestic IO 
variable is low and it is not in line with institutional herding during these extreme days.  It is 
important to notice that even if there is some relationship between the two variables, it is not 
possible to be sure that the large market swings are caused by institutions and not by 
individuals’ decision.  These institutions, as banks and mutual funds, are vehicles used by 
individual investors to trade.  The decision to buy or sell is not only dependent of the money 
managers.  Individuals can also be the cause for institutions to sell or buy during these event-
days since they give the order to trade.  Overall the empirical results for the abnormal return 
regression suggest that on event-days, foreign institutional herding is much more visible than 
domestic one.  The level of significance of aggregate IO is low for both types of event-days, 
however when compared with DS empirical findings, it is important to highlight a small 
improvement. For the up market event-days, DS obtained a t-statistic value of 0.46 with a 
coefficient of 0.001 while for the down market event-days, the t-statistic and coefficient value 
remain low, being -0.82 and -0.001 respectively. On the other hand, DS also presents results 
for IO decomposed. Their findings conclude that different types of IO have different behaves 
on such event-days, suggesting that specially managers from mutual funds, pension funds and 
endowments herd and trade with the momentum.  
The reason to use the equal-weighted data is connected with the possible bias that could 
happen. With the value-weighted data, the methodology could pick days in which larger firms 
had moved more than smaller ones. As it was previously said, size is highly correlated with 
the level of IO of a firm. Conditioning our analysis to the value-weighted data could have 
biased our results. Overall the results obtained are not so satisfactory in terms of our 
prediction. The cross-sectional distribution of returns on the event-days can be related to the 




3. Abnormal Turnover Evidence 
 
The previous results showed that there is a relationship between the event-day abnormal 
return and the level of IO, and stronger for foreign IO.  A possible cause for the relationship 
between abnormal return and IO can be the trade volume.  If during these market extreme 
days, institutions buy (up market event-days) or panic and sell (down market event-days), a 
high level of volume shall be noticed.  This section aims to understand the relationship 
between turnover and institutional ownership. 
On Table I, the descriptive statistics have shown that firms with higher level of IO, are 
more liquid firms.  However, as it was stated before, literature findings say that institutions 
prefer more liquid stocks. In order to take further conclusions about the relationship between 
turnover and firm’s level of IO, it is necessary to compare it against abnormal turnover.  A 
comparison between regular turnover and low or high levels of IO would not bring any valid 
conclusions. Abnormal turnover is defined as the difference between the daily turnover of 
firm i on event-day j and the eleven-year average (2000-2010) of firm’s i turnover 
(unconditional average).  Stocks that compose the high IO subsample have on average higher 
values than the low IO portfolio (corresponding to a mean of 0.0004 for the low IO portfolio 
and a mean of 0.0024 for the high IO portfolio for the up market event-days and a mean of 
0.0003 for the low IO portfolio and a mean of 0.0017 for the high IO portfolio for the down 
market event-days). The t-test to determine if the means of the two subsamples are equal, 
rejects the equality at one percent significance level. 
The purpose of this regression is to try to understand if the variable IO has any statistical 
significance relatively to the abnormal turnover.  If the level of firms’ IO is associated to the 
abnormal turnover, one can infer that in fact, on such event-days, institutions are contributing 
to the increase of liquidity and therefore they can be herding and trading with  momentum.  
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions are used:  
  !"#$%! = γ! + γ!!"#$! + γ!!"!"#$%&! + γ!!"! + !!  (2) 
 
where the dependent variable, aturn, is the event-day abnormal turnover, the difference 
between daily turnover of firm i on event-day j and the eleven-year average (2000-2010) of 
firm’s i turnover.  Turnover is defined as the daily volume of a stock expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of shares outstanding on the event-day.  Since firms with 




a control variable to make sure that these firms maintain the high levels of turnover on days 
with extreme returns.  The abnormal turnover, previously defined, shall be a good measure. 
The independent variables are size, variance and IO. The decision to include size and variance 
as control variables are related to the preference of institutions to larger firms and higher 
levels of idiosyncratic risk, as explained in the previous section.  
On Table IV, the results are presented for up and down event-days and are divided into 
Panel A which aggregates IO and Panel B which disaggregates IO into domestic and foreign.   
 
Table IV 
Event-Day Abnormal Turnover Regression  – All stocks 
This table presents the estimates of the event-day abnormal turnover regression on IO and control variables for 
the market: 
!"#$%! = !! + !!!"#$! + !!!"#$"%&'! + !!!"! + !! 
 
The event-days are defined as (a) up market, days in which the market return is two standard deviation above its 
eleven-year average (from 2000 to 2010) and (b) down market, days in which the market return is two standard 
deviation below its eleven-year average (from 2000 to 2010). The dependent variable is the event-day abnormal 
turnover, the difference between daily turnover of firm i on event-day j and the eleven-year average (2000-2010) 
of firm’s i turnover. The independent variables are size, the natural logarithm of the firm’s equity 50 days prior 
to the event-day; variance, the market model residual variance for the period [-250,-50]; io, the percentage of IO 
on the capital structure of a company on the event-day. The table presents the mean, t-statistic for a null 
hypothesis of zero mean, minimum and maximum coefficient estimated.  
 
	  	   Up Event-Days 	  	   Down Event-Days 
  Mean t-stat Min Max   Mean t-stat Min Max 
Panel A: Aggregated IO 
size 0.004 4.68 -0.004 0.012   0.003 3.66 -0.017 0.013 
variance -0.180 -1.96 -1.345 1.126   -0.273 -3.23 -1.402 2.507 
Io 0.002 2.36 -0.004 0.014   0.001 0.97 -0.003 0.033 
Panel B: Segregated IO 
size 0.003 4.69 -0.004 0.011   0.003 3.60 -0.016 0.012 
variance -0.199 -2.17 -1.336 1.133   -0.293 -3.42 -1.401 2.553 
dom io 0.001 1.99 -0.004 0.016   0.001 0.69 -0.003 0.035 
for io 0.007 2.45 -0.124 0.033   0.005 2.10 -0.091 0.028 
 
First, size matters. On such extreme days, there is a considerable statistical significance 
between the firm size and its abnormal turnover. Its average coefficient of 0.004 and 0.003 
also shows that besides its statistical meaning, size also has an economical significance. The 
results for the second control variable of the regression also show that variance is contributing 
to the level of abnormal turnover of the firms, more on the down market event-days than on 
the extreme positive days. The IO coefficient is positive and highly significant for the up 




market, institutions herd and trade with the momentum. On the other hand, the results for the 
down market event-days do not sustain the herding behaviour on such extreme days (t-
statistic 0.97). Despite these inconclusive results, when IO is disaggregated, the variable of 
foreign IO turns out to be statistically significant, suggesting that firms with higher levels of 
foreign IO have larger abnormal turnovers on the event-days. Again, fitting the previous 
results from the abnormal return regression, there is some evidence that foreign institutions 
react to large market swings. Comparing the results with those of Dennis and Strickland 
(2002), the conclusions are in clear contrast. Their empirical results regarding the abnormal 
turnover and IO, identify a relationship between the two variables during both types of event-
days, leading them to conclude that during the extreme days, institutions are the cause for the 
abnormal turnover. The two control variables have no statistical significance. Their evidence 
suggests, more than ours, that institutions herd together and trade with the momentum of the 
market.  
The regression results concerning the aggregate IO are very different for the two types of 
event-days and overall it is not possible to suggest that the cause for the abnormal turnover on 
such event-days come from institutional trades.  However, it is possible to infer that in fact, 
foreign institutions seem to have a relationship with both abnormal returns and abnormal 
turnovers on days with large market swings.  Another possible inference that can be made, is 
that firms with more market capitalization are the ones that are contributing more to such 
abnormal turnover levels.   
 
4. Post-event Performance 
 
The empirical findings regarding the event-days variables have not been so conclusive 
about the contribution of institutions to the extreme returns verified on such days.  However, 
for the up (down) market days, the high IO firms have event-day returns higher (lower) than 
the low IO firms.  This statistical evidence fits the idea that institutions herd on such days and 
contribute to such extreme returns.  However, this would not be a problem if in fact 
institutions were driving stock’s prices to their fundamental value.   
     Table V presents six months returns after the event-days to ascertain if institutions are (a) 
contributing to market efficiency or (b) if they are just trading with the momentum 
contributing only to market volatility. If six months after the event-day stock’s prices go back 




strategies can be used to take advantage of this mispricing. Table V presents results for all 
firms and for several cuts. First, we divide the sample into non-IO firms and IO firms. Then 
we sort IO firms into quintiles based on IO on the event-day. Panel A and B present the 
results for up and down market event-days, respectively.  The first row presents the average 
of the percentage of IO on the event-days for each of the subsamples.  The second row 
presents the event-day return average. The third row presents the average of the six months 
returns (125 days) after the event-day.  The post-event return averages are tested to see if they 
are significantly different from zero.  The standard deviation,  skewness and kurtosis are 
computed next.  The last row contains the average number of stocks on the event-days.  To 
avoid a bias, all returns and averages are equal-weighted, since institutions own on average 
larger firms (Gompers and Metrick (2001); Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003); Campbell, 
Ramadorai and Schwartz (2009)). 
Up and down market event-days have different contrasting results.  The average of event-
day return for the up market event-days is similar to all the subsamples, except for the first 
quintile IO firms. From this, it is not possible to conclude that institutions trade more than 
individual investors on those same event-days. However, using post-event 125-return, IO 
firms have significant positive returns whereas non-IO firms have negative returns. The 
difference between the two type of firms is statistically significant. These conclusions are in 
clear contrast to our expectations if institutions would herd, i.e., if in fact institutions herd 
during the event-day and move the stock’s price away from their true value, then a negative 
six month post-event return, moving the stock’s price to its prior value. 
On the other hand, the results from Panel B (down market event-days) lead us to think that 
in fact on such extreme days, institutions have herd and deviate stock’s prices from their true 
value.  Although, the event-day return average is not sufficient to conclude that IO firms have 
more negative returns than non-IO firms on the event-days, the difference between the post-
event performance of low IO firms and high IO firms is sufficient to infer a different 
behaviour between institutions and individuals.  IO firms six month post-event returns are 
statistically positive and different from the non-IO firms. This shows that the market correct 
the previously oversell by institutions on the event-day and moved the stock’s prices back 
again to their previous value.  
     This is in line with Schnusenberg and Madura (2001). After examining six US indexes, 




day period following negative market shocks. This results are consist with the Uncertain 
Information Hypothesis (UIH), a hypothesis put forward by Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) 
that states that after the release of new information regarding a security creates considerable 
uncertainty.  Therefore an investment on that security entails additional risk for the investor  
 
Table V 
Post-event Performance Statistics  – All stocks 
This table presents the post-event performance statistics for all stocks. The sample is divided into non-IO firms 
and IO firms. IO firms are sliced into quintiles on IO. The first row contains the average of IO on the event-day. 
The event-days are defined as (a) up market, days in which the market return is two standard deviations above its 
eleven-year unconditional average (from 2000 to 2010) and (b) down market, days in which the market return is 
two standard deviations below its eleven-year unconditional average (from 2000 to 2010). The event-day return 
is the average of the event-day returns. The post-event return is defined as being the 6-month return (125 days) 
after the event-day. It is also computed a post-event return average for each of the eleven subsamples. This table 
presents an average of the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis on the event-days. The average number of 
stocks in portfolio is an equal-weighted average of the number of stocks that each of the subsamples contains on 
















High IO  
–  
Low IO 




 (I) (II) (II) – (I) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)-(1) (5)-(I)  
Panel A: Up Event-Days 
Instit. ownership (%) 0.00 62.72 62.72 18.10 46.15 68.52 84.06 96.75 78.65 96.75 61.69 
Event-day return (%) 4.05 4.24 0.19 2.96 4.23 4.67 4.71 4.66 1.69 0.60 4.24 
Post-event return (%) -1.84 9.58 11.41 8.86 10.42 9.97 9.71 8.93 0.07 10.77 9.39 
    t-statistic -0.52 2.93 12.34 2.90 3.04 2.97 2.85 2.77 0.07 9.77 2.87 
    St. deviation 0.27 0.25 0.07 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.08 0.09 0.25 
    Skewness -0.77 -0.82 0.24 -0.73 -0.68 -0.52 -0.94 -1.25 -0.44 0.37 -0.81 
    Kurtosis 1.29 1.80 -0.50 0.93 1.38 1.29 2.10 3.05 0.01 -0.46 1.77 
Average # stocks  38 2,409 
 
482 482 482 482 482 
  
2,447 
Panel B: Down Event-Days 
Instit. ownership (%) 0.00 63.53 63.53 18.66 47.15 69.55 84.98 97.31 78.65 97.31 62.64 
Event-day return (%) -4.67 -4.53 0.14 -3.52 -4.61 -4.88 -4.94 -4.71 -1.20 -0.04 -4.54 
Post-event return (%) -6.67 6.37 13.03 4.07 6.76 7.22 6.91 6.89 2.83 13.56 6.19 
    t-statistic -1.71 1.85 13.39 1.30 1.88 2.08 1.89 1.97 3.07 11.84 1.79 
    St. deviation 0.32 0.28 0.08 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.08 0.09 0.28 
    Skewness -0.84 -1.03 -0.08 -0.88 -0.88 -0.77 -1.18 -1.37 -0.88 0.18 -1.03 
    Kurtosis 0.90 1.36 -0.56 0.87 1.01 1.00 1.64 2.12 0.49 -0.40 1.34 
Average # stocks 34 2,476 
 




and a rational investor will require an additional premium as compensation for the additional 
risk. The main consequence of this theory implies that after a very negative event-day, 
average abnormal returns will be positive and post-positive event abnormal returns will be 




Thomas (2003) use a similar methodology and also report findings consistent with the UIH, 
i.e. investors overreact to bad news and as a consequence observe significant reversals but 
underreact to good news and observe significant positive post-event returns.  
Regarding the up market event-days results, it is also possible to link with ideas first 
introduced by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Welch (1992), the informational cascades. The 
basic concept of this type of herding, is that agents see what other agents have previously 
done and prefer to ignore their own private information. For example if an agent has 
information that may convince him not to buy a certain stock, but he/she sees that other 
institutions have bought it, the agent prefer to ignore its private information and go along with 
the herd. As Keynes (1936) thought, the stock market is like a beauty contest where judges 
choose the winner not because she is the most beautiful but because they think that other 
judges will pick her. Overall what our results for the up market event-days can show is some 
evidence of bubbles, caused by herding, namely informational cascades.  Again, if institutions 
are herding and contributing only for the growth of a bubble, at a certain point, the market 
shall correct stock’s prices and move it again to its fundamental value. 
The findings on this paper are similar to those of DS. The different behaviour of 
institutions on both types of event-days is also verified on their post-event statistics which fits 
to our previously justifications fitting the UIH.  
 
5. Conditional Event-Day Definition 
 
This section tests the same hypothesis that institutional ownership is linked to extreme 
stock return movements using a rolling window definition of event-days. We use the same 
methodology as before but an event-day is defined when the market return is two standard 
deviations above its one-year moving average, up market day, or two standard deviations 
below its one-year moving average, down market day. Between 2000 and 2010 there were 71 
up market event-days, with an average return of 3.39% and 109 down market event-days with 
an average return of -3.36%. On Figure 2, the distribution of events over time is presented. It 
is clear that most events cluster over time. In comparison to the unconditional definition of 
event-days, most of the events are the same, but now our sample increases mostly in the 











Figure 3. Conditional event-days. Above the timeline are registered the up market event-days and below the timeline are registered 
the down market event-days. 
 
We estimate Equation (1) to understand the relationship between IO and abnormal return 
on these event-days. The level of significance for the aggregated IO variable for both types of 
extreme days increased. The t-statistics of 1.35 and 2.28 for the up market event-days and for 
the down market event-days respectively, show that for our out-of-sample test, the relation is 
more significant than before. The results for the segregated IO are completely different. The 
variable of foreign IO lacks statistical significance and the relation between the domestic IO 
variable and the abnormal returns continued to be statistically insignificant.  
The biggest improvement registered is linked to estimation model (2), concerning the 
relation between the abnormal turnover and the level of IO on the event-days. For both types 
of event-days, the variable of aggregated IO registers very high t-statistics, suggesting a 
relation between the two variables. Regarding the segregated IO, the foreign IO variable loses 
its statistical significance but on the other hand, the domestic IO variable suffer an 
improvement regarding its significance. With t-statistics of 6.45 and 4.81 for the up and down 
market event-days respectively, we can conclude that during the event-days, firms with higher 
levels of domestic IO are contributing to the abnormal levels of turnover.  
Evidence from the post-event performance, suggest that during the event-days, firms are in 
fact herding. When the event-day returns is decomposed into the 5 quintiles, it is possible to 
conclude that stocks with higher levels of IO are the ones that have the most extreme returns, 
for both types of event-days. The similarity with the analysis that was done on Section III.4. 
ends it here. The post-event performances results are inconclusive. In fact, stocks that do not 
have any IO are the ones that six months after the event-day have the most extreme returns.  
 
IV. Extreme Stocks 
 
In this section, we focus only on the stocks that (a) on the up market event-days had returns 
two standard deviations above its unconditional average and (b) on the down market event-
days had returns two standard deviations below its unconditional average. We expect 
institutional herding to be more visible when we exclude the stocks that do not contribute for 





1. Event-Days Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table VI presents the descriptive statistics for the event-days for stocks with extreme 
returns as stated before and its structure is the same as Table II. The size statistics again, show 
that institutions prefer stocks with bigger size. An average size of 15.605 and 15.615 for up 
and down market event-days, corresponds to an increase of size on our stock’s sample when 
compared with Section III. The increase is not statistically significant but since institutions 
prefer stocks with a bigger size, our sample of stocks with extreme returns show signs of 
being a sample with more IO, which lead us to think that institutions in fact can be 
contributing more for the extreme returns. In terms of liquidity, the turnover variable in 
comparison with the previous analysis, show signs of increase. Our sample now is composed 
by stocks with higher levels of turnover than before. Again it lead us to think that our sample 
has higher levels of IO since institutions prefer more liquid stocks. When decomposing the 
turnover variable into the two subsamples, again it is possible to confirm that stocks with 
higher levels of IO are much more liquid than the others. The variance statistics do not show 
any significant change however it confirms that institutions prefer stocks with low levels of 
idiosyncratic risk when compared with others. The beta statistics show that our sample for 
this Section IV has stocks with more systematic risk. Again, when beta statistics are 
decomposed, it is possible to confirm that stocks with a higher level of IO prefer stocks with 
bigger betas. Taking into account that previous literature and our statistics show that 
institutions prefer these kind of stocks, it lead us to think that our sample of stocks with 
extreme returns have in fact higher levels of IO which can be a sign of their contribution to 
extreme returns on the event-days. When analysing the IO statistics, it is possible to confirm 
that there is an increase of the presence of institutions on our stock sample. An average of 
59.3 percent represents an increase of 0.9 and 0.3 percent of the level of IO on the up and 
down market event-days respectively. An increase of the level of IO on this sample, would 
lead us to think that in fact institutions could be contributing more to the extreme returns but 
in fact, the return statistics lead us to think that this may not be happening. Despite the 
increase on absolute values of the returns for both types of event-days (more positive returns 
for the up market event-days and more negative returns for the down market event-days), the 
descriptive statistics show that in fact higher returns on up market event-days are associated 





Event-Day Descriptive Statistics  – Extreme Stock Returns 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 60 up market event-days (Panel A) and for the 68 down 
market event-days (Panel B). This table is structured as Table II. 
 
Panel A: Up Event-Days 
Variable Sample Min 25th Median Mean 75th Max Std dev 
size All firms 13.646 15.428 15.645 15.605 15.835 16.376 0.333 
  io < Median 13.646 15.216 15.451 15.434 15.662 16.376 0.348 
  io > Median 14.681 15.636 15.769 15.776 15.918 16.294 0.205 
turnover All firms 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.015 0.147 0.012 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.100 0.009 
  io > Median 0.000 0.008 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.147 0.013 
variance All firms 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.098 0.003 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.098 0.004 
  io > Median 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.001 
beta All firms -3.198 0.694 1.062 1.061 1.377 4.160 0.550 
  io < Median -3.198 0.477 0.901 0.939 1.336 4.160 0.621 
  io > Median -0.064 0.906 1.148 1.182 1.404 3.597 0.436 
io All firms 0.000 0.350 0.655 0.593 0.850 1.000 0.296 
  io < Median 0.000 0.175 0.350 0.340 0.509 0.654 0.193 
  io > Median 0.655 0.761 0.850 0.845 0.935 1.000 0.102 
return All firms 0.031 0.082 0.106 0.118 0.140 0.821 0.055 
  io < Median 0.038 0.092 0.124 0.135 0.165 0.821 0.065 
  io > Median 0.031 0.077 0.094 0.101 0.117 0.384 0.036 
 
Panel B: Down Event-Days 
Variable Sample Min 25th Median Mean 75th Max Std dev 
size All firms 12.875 15.435 15.649 15.615 15.846 16.376 0.325 
  io < Median 12.875 15.236 15.457 15.439 15.649 16.376 0.332 
  io > Median 15.057 15.648 15.786 15.791 15.928 16.311 0.200 
turnover All firms 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.011 0.014 1.634 0.032 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.435 0.014 
  io > Median 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.016 0.019 1.634 0.043 
variance All firms 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.032 0.002 
  io < Median 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.032 0.002 
  io > Median 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.001 
beta All firms -1.023 0.675 1.049 1.040 1.359 4.650 0.534 
  io < Median -1.023 0.451 0.865 0.914 1.300 4.650 0.596 
  io > Median -0.113 0.875 1.152 1.166 1.396 3.738 0.428 
Io All firms 0.000 0.347 0.649 0.593 0.853 1.000 0.297 
  io < Median 0.000 0.179 0.346 0.339 0.514 0.649 0.192 
  io > Median 0.649 0.761 0.853 0.847 0.939 1.000 0.103 
Return All firms -1.770 -0.137 -0.104 -0.115 -0.080 -0.027 0.060 
  io < Median -1.770 -0.157 -0.122 -0.131 -0.089 -0.027 0.073 





with stock with low levels of IO. Beside this, the subsample of stocks with high levels of IO 
has a standard deviation much smaller. This statistics show signs of institutional herding in a 
different way that was expected. What is shown is that institutions are not contributing to the 
extreme returns, in fact they are contributing to contradict the general trend in the market on 
such days. 
 
2. Abnormal Return Evidence 
 
The independent variables used to compute the regression are the ones analyzed on the 
previous section. Like before, the technique used to compute the regression is the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) one. We use the previously defined estimation model (1). 
The dependent variable ari is the market adjusted return for firm i on the event-day j. The 
market adjusted return is defined as being the difference between the eleven-year 
unconditional average (2000-2010) of stock’s i return and stock’s i return on the event-day j. 
The coefficients used to make our conclusions are the time-series average of the coefficients 
of the several event-days. Table VII presents all the results for the abnormal return regression. 
The results are divided into Panel A, aggregated IO and Panel B, disaggregated IO. 
 
Table VII 
Event-day Adjusted market Return Regression  – Extreme Stock Returns 
This table presents the result for the event-day adjusted market return regression on IO and control variables for 
the equal-weighted market following model (1) for extreme stock returns. This table is structured as Table III. 
 
	  	   Up Event-Days 	  	   Down Event-Days 
  Mean t-stat Min Max   Mean t-stat Min Max 
Panel A: Aggregated IO 
size -0.061 -9.087 -0.168 -0.012   0.062 15.858 0.007 0.127 
turnover 0.907 15.683 0.183 2.151   -1.155 -9.556 -3.551 0.133 
variance 11.052 8.206 1.386 31.289   -11.816 -5.543 -80.742 -1.429 
beta 0.015 8.043 -0.009 0.047   -0.011 -5.239 -0.049 0.025 
io -0.021 -10.767 -0.064 0.005   0.020 7.386 -0.018 0.078 
Panel B: Segregated IO 
size -0.060 -8.92 -0.175 -0.009   0.061 15.99 0.009 0.130 
turnover 0.907 15.80 0.170 2.137   -1.157 -9.60 -3.550 0.109 
variance 11.071 8.34 1.542 31.287   -11.893 -5.56 -80.880 -1.425 
beta 0.015 8.13 -0.010 0.046   -0.011 -5.22 -0.049 0.026 
dom io -0.020 -10.18 -0.063 0.004   0.020 7.12 -0.020 0.075 
for io -0.034 -2.66 -0.326 0.176   0.029 3.14 -0.195 0.208 
 




statistical significance for both types of event-days, a very different result from the previous 
analysis. However, the empirical results from the regression show that the relationship 
between size and abnormal return is slightly different from what would be expected. Although 
the size of a firm is related with its abnormal return on the event-day, size is not contributing 
to an increase of the absolute return on such days, in fact bigger firms have smaller absolute 
returns on extreme days, which is possible to confer by the value of the coefficient (-0.061 for 
up market event-days and 0.062 for down market event-days).  
     On the other hand, the relation between turnover and abnormal return is as it was expected. 
With a t-statistic of 15.683 and -9.556 for up and down market event-days respectively, the 
level of abnormal returns is intrinsically related with the level of liquidity of the stocks, being 
an increase of turnover a sign of increase of the absolute abnormal return of a stock for both 
types of event-days. The main variable of interest for our analysis, IO level, lead us to 
different conclusions for each of the event-days. For the up market event-days, the average 
coefficient for IO is -0.021 with a t-statistic of -10.767. There are no questions that on up 
market event-days, there is a relation between the abnormal returns and the level of IO of a 
firm, leading us to think that in fact institutions can herd on such days. However, institutions 
herd in a different way that it was expected. They are not contributing for the extreme returns 
verified in such days, in fact they are herding on the opposite direction. Despite the herding 
evidence during the up market event-days, it is not possible to say that institutions are buying 
and contributing for the extreme positive returns. The segregation of IO by types of 
institutions as DS do on their work, would show if this is the general trend for all types of 
institutions or if there are any outliers. On their empirical results, DS show that different 
institutions react differently to these event-days. Institutions as banks and insurance 
companies do not contribute for the abnormal returns on such extreme-days, in fact they react 
as our results also show, on the opposite direction. Regarding the results of the IO variable for 
the down market event-days, the high level of statistical significance and the value of the 
coefficient fit the same idea. On such days, institutions herd but on the opposite direction. 
Overall, the empirical results show evidence of herding but in fact institutions are not 
contributing to the extreme returns verified on such days. The coefficients values show that in 
fact institutions are herding on the opposite direction and that this kind of investors are not the 
ones contributing for the extreme returns on such days. The different results that are registered 




data sample. Our sample reflects a period of one of the largest crisis that was ever registered 
and the reactions by institutions can be very different from a period of prosperity as the one 
analyzed by previous works.  
 
3. Abnormal Turnover Evidence 
 
As it was possible to confirm on the previous section, institutional herding happens during 
the event-days, however on a different direction that it would be expected to see. Institutions 
are in fact contributing to reducing the extreme returns that are verified on such extreme days. 
One possible cause for the abnormal returns and IO relation can be the volume of trade. If 
institutions on up market event-days are selling and during the down market event-days are 
buying, it shall be seen an increase of the levels of liquidity on stocks with more IO. For that 
reason, this section evaluates the relationship between abnormal turnover and the level of IO 
of the firms. In order to do it, the technique of Fama and MacBeth (1973) is used again to 
compute the following regression. The previously defined estimation model (2), is used to 
understand better the relationship between stock’s liquidity and IO. 
The dependent variable is abnormal turnover and it was previously defined. The 
independent variables are size, variance and IO. Their definitions are the same as before. The 
results from the estimation model (2) are presented in Table VIII. The empirical results show 
that besides of our variable of interest, the two control variables, size and variance are also 
positive and highly significant. Stocks with bigger size and more idiosyncratic risk are 
associated with higher levels of abnormal turnover for both types of event-days. Regarding 
the IO variable and fitting the previous results, the very positive coefficient and t-statistic 
relate the percentage of IO of a firm with the level of abnormal turnover on days with extreme 
returns. The t-statistic of 8.205 and 5.076 for up and down market event-days are supportive 
of our idea of herding and reaction by institutions to extreme market days. From the 
descriptive statistics of this Section IV, the turnover variable already showed that firms with 
high levels of IO are associated with high levels of liquidity, which is confirmed by the 
abnormal turnover regression evidence. Despite institutions herding on a different direction 
that was expected, the evidence form model (2) confirms that firms liquidity is intrinsically 








Event-Day Abnormal Turnover Regression  – Extreme Stock Returns 
This table presents the result for the event-day abnormal turnover regression on IO and control variables for the 
equal-weighted market following model (2) for extreme stock returns. This table is structured as Table IV.  
 
	  	   Up Event-Days 	  	   Down Event-Days 
  Mean t-stat Min Max   Mean t-stat Min Max 
Panel A: Aggregated IO 
size 0.015 9.790 0.001 0.038   0.014 9.002 -0.055 0.032 
variance 2.200 5.471 -0.208 14.835   2.005 3.560 -0.576 24.771 
io 0.008 8.205 -0.001 0.025   0.008 5.076 -0.009 0.081 
Panel B: Segregated IO 
size 0.014 9.28 -0.001 0.036   0.012 9.12 -0.055 0.036 
variance 2.104 5.20 -0.331 14.681   1.914 3.46 -0.634 24.975 
dom io 0.007 7.18 -0.004 0.025   0.007 4.34 -0.008 0.090 
for io 0.032 7.12 -0.007 0.154   0.020 3.60 -0.180 0.101 
 
4. Post-event Performance 
 
Overall the two regressions previously computed to understand the behaviour of 
institutions on the event-days, lead us to the conclusion that institutions in fact herd but on a 
different direction that the market tends to. During extreme days with very positive returns, 
empirical evidence show that institutions are contributing to diminish the level of abnormal 
returns. On the other hand, on such days that the market extremes are very negative, 
institutions join efforts to prevent their position’s devaluation. The following section, intends 
to understand the performance of stocks with different levels of IO after the event-days.  
Table IX is computed with six months post-event returns.  
In contrast to Section III, the average event-day return is more extreme than before. The 
level of IO is negatively related to the level of absolute returns on the event-days. On average, 
stocks with more IO on up market event-days have less positive returns and during down 
market event-days, stocks with more IO have less negative returns. Joining the results from 
the previous regressions and Table IX evidence, it is possible to infer that institutions during 
event-days in fact do not contribute to the market trend. Their possible herding behaviour is 
only contributing to reduce the effects from the general tendency of the market. Regarding the 
post-event performances, the results are similar to the ones found on Section III. For both 
types of event-days it is possible to confirm the relation between the six months returns after 




did not correct the extreme returns verified on the event-day, in fact stocks with higher levels 
of IO have increased their market value.  
On the other hand and regarding the down market event-days, stocks with higher levels of 
IO had post-event performances much higher than the ones with no IO. The relation is again 
clear. Although the previous regressions have shown that in such days, institutions are not 
contributing to the very negative returns, stocks with more institutions on their capital 
structure are the ones that have significant positive returns, leading to the conclusion that on 
down market event-days, these stocks are the ones that suffer bigger deviations from their 
fundamental prices. The differences of post-event returns between stocks with low and high 
levels of IO is so large that the results have to be significant. 
 
Table IX 
Post-event Performance Statistics – Extreme Stock Returns 












firms Q2 Q3 Q4 
High IO 
firms 
High IO  
–  
Low IO 
High IO  
– 
 Non-IO  
All firms 
 (I) (II) (II) - (I) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)-(1) (5)-(I)  
Panel A: Up market 
Instit. ownership (%) 0.00 67.62 67.62 26.33 55.34 73.20 85.96 97.26 70.93 97.26 66.73 
Event-day return (%) 14.04 10.32 -3.50 12.07 10.89 9.67 9.63 9.34 -2.74 -4.56 10.36 
Post-event return (%) -2.79 8.68 11.57 3.92 7.99 10.11 10.91 10.45 6.54 13.48 8.56 
    t-statistic -0.57 2.57 4.03 1.45 2.22 2.87 2.93 2.89 4.47 4.69 2.53 
    St.Dev 0.36 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.11 0.21 0.26 
    Skewness -0.69 -0.70 -0.16 -0.70 -0.42 -0.47 -0.71 -1.08 -1.19 -0.34 -0.71 
    Kurtosis 0.84 1.83 -0.13 1.59 1.27 1.44 1.51 2.86 1.48 -0.44 1.83 
Average # stocks  8 650 
 
130 130 130 130 131 
  
657 
Panel B: Down market 
Instit. ownership (%) 0.00 67.36 67.36 25.79 55.04 73.03 85.73 97.20 71.41 97.20 66.58 
Event-day return (%) -13.26 -9.97 3.21 -11.71 -10.37 -9.26 -9.42 -9.10 2.62 4.13 -10.02 
Post-event return (%) 0.86 9.28 9.36 5.88 9.26 9.85 10.34 11.06 5.18 11.56 9.18 
    t-statistic 0.17 2.58 3.27 1.98 2.51 2.72 2.60 2.77 3.19 4.13 2.55 
    St.Dev 0.40 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.13 0.23 0.30 
    Skewness -0.84 -1.03 -0.08 -0.88 -0.88 -0.77 -1.18 -1.37 -0.88 0.18 -1.03 
    Kurtosis 0.90 1.36 -0.56 0.87 1.01 1.00 1.64 2.12 0.49 -0.40 1.34 
Average # stocks 7 654 
 












This paper examines the behaviour of institutions during extreme days in the US market 
since 2000.  According to previous literature (Nofsinger and Sias (1999); Cai, Kaul, and 
Zheng (2000); Sias, Starks, and Titman (2001)) institutions tend to herd during these event-
days and as a consequence deviate stock’s prices from their true value.  Following the 
overreaction, past losers become underpriced and past winners become overpriced.  If in fact 
institutions herd and overreact, it is possible to take advantage of this mispricing using 
contrarian strategies since the price will return to its fundamental value. 
We first focus on the behaviour of institutions during the event-days.  Our examination of 
the relationship between the level of IO on a firm’s capital structure and abnormal turnover on 
these extreme days is consistent to institutional herding and Dennis and Strickland (2002) 
findings who analyze the same problem in a previous period of time.  However, the results 
from the relationship between the level of IO and abnormal returns are remarkable different 
from DS.  For both types of event-days, up and down market event-days, the empirical 
evidence shows that institutions herd in different ways. They are not adding to the extreme 
returns on such extreme days.  In fact, they are contradicting the momentum.   This is even 
more true for foreign institutions. 
The 6 month post-event performance’s results show that the market reacts differently for 
down and up extreme event-day returns.  For the former, we find evidence of overreaction by 
institutions to the event-days and as a consequence positive returns for high IO firms six 
months after the extreme event-days.  For the latter, there is underreaction by institutions to 
the event-days six months after, i.e., high IO firms had positive returns when compared to 
non-IO or low IO firms.  These results are consistent to the Uncertain Information Hypothesis 
and herding theory, namely, informational cascades. The results from the post-event 
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